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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
said that "all law is couched in general terms, but there are some
cases upon which it is impossible to pronounce correctly in general
terms."' '0 Since experts are now able to give reliable, detailed testi-
mony concerning the separate value of timber and minerals, it only
seems logical that appellate courts should uphold the admissibility
of such evidence where proper safeguarding instructions are given
by the trial judge.
Roger D. Graham
Peace Bond - A Questionable Procedure for a
Legitimate State Interest
I. LEGACY FROM THE TIME OF THE CANTERBURY TALES
In the time when Chaucer was creating literary history in
England with The Canterbury Tales,' King Edward IH was creating
judicial history, and perhaps a judicial albatross, with the peace
bond.2 Just as The Canterbury Tales survived the centuries and
became a familiar part of our life, so has the peace bond. Today,
in West Virginia, the peace bond operates as the common man's
route to "justice."3 The peace bond is used as the answer to alterca-
tions between spouses, neighbors, or strangers.
In practice, the peace bond is analogous to the old medicine
man's claims for his "cure-all" tonic. However, notwithstanding its
common law origin or its presence in most states,' this practice should
o0 AxUsToTLE, POLITICS Bk. III, Ch. 16, 1287a, 24 et. seq.; NICOMACHEAN
ETHics Bk. V, Ch. 10, 1137b, 13-31.
'Geoffrey Chaucer is believed to have lived from 1340 to 1400. 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNIcA 354 (1970).
2 During this period mercenaries pillaged an English countryside already
disrupted by war, famine, and plague. As a result Parliament enacted the
Statute of Westminister, 34 Edw. 3, c.1 (1360), assigning "in every County
of England ... for the keeping of the peace, one Lord, and with him three
or four of the most worthy in the county .... ." Note, Peace and Behavior
Bonds--Summary Punishment For Uncommitted Offenses, 52 VA. L. REv.
914 (1966).
3 Obtaining a peace warrant in West Virginia is a simple matter. The
individual goes to the local justice of the peace, makes a complaint, pays his
money and a warrant is issued. Later a hearing is held, in which the complain-
ant and the defendant appear before the justice. Unlike trials before a cir-
cuit court judge, the whole process in the peace bond proceeding is very in-
formal, and the usual citizen has little hesitation in instituting such an action.4 ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 401 (1958); ALAs. CODE § 12.60040 (1962); ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1221 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-215 (1964); CAL.
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be re-examined in view of the limits of permissible government
interference with man's liberty.
Unfortunately, because peace bond proceedings are seldom
appealed,5 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has rarely
dealt with the issue. Thus, a hypothetical situation may facilitate
examinating the constitutionality of the procedure.
The defendant husband has a history of excessive drinking.
His wife causes a warrant to be issued by a justice of the peace
charging him with an assault against her.6 A hearing on the charges
PEN. CODE § 701 (1960); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-2-1 (1963); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-5 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 5903 (1953); FLA.
STAT. § 37.21 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 76.21 (1961); ILL. REV. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 200-02 (1971 Supp.); IDAHO CODE ANN. 19-206 (1948); IowA CODE
Ann. § 760.1 (1950); LA. CODE, Cim. PRoc. art. 27 (1966); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. ch 15, § 1706 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art 52, §46 (1970); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 275, § 2 (1959); Mcn. STAT. ANN. § 28.1155 (1954), MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 625.02 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2583 (1956); Mo. PEv.
STAT. ANN. § 542.030 (1953); MONT. RPv. CODE ANN. § 94-5101 (1947);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 170.060 (1963); N.Y. CODE CEIM. PROC. § 84 (1971);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 36-14-1 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-29 (1953); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 29-02-06 (1960); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2933.02 (1954);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 41 (1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 145.120 (1969); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit 19 § 23 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-4-3 (1956); S.D.
CODE § 34.0302 (1960 Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-302 (1955); TEx.
CODE CUMM. PRoc. art. 7.01 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-4-1 (1957); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.1-20 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.13.020 (1961);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-58 (1957).
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-202, repealed 1970; Wis. STAT. ANN. §
962.02, repealed 1970.
The reason peace bond proceedings are rarely appealed is that one must
post a recognizance bond before an appeal can be taken, and if one can not
post the bond and is subsequently sent to jail, naturally one is denied the
appeal. See W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 10 § 3 (Michie 1966).
However, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
West Virginia, recently decided a case involving the peace bond statutes. In
Roberts v. Janco, Civil No. 71-97-E (N.D. W. Va. Dec. 22, 1971), the peti-
tioner, a 25-year-old woman, sought habeas corpus relief from a jail sentence
imposed after she pleaded guilty to the allegations in a peace warrant, and
then was unable to post a bond to keep the peace. Judge Maxwell although
upholding the constitutionality of the statutes held that defendants in peace
bond proceedings have a right to counsel. In considering the petitioner s due
process and equal protection arguments, he said "the legislature has the op-
portunity to consider the possibility of statutory changes in light of these
constitutional challenges."6 Specifically, the statute setting forth the initial procedure is:
If complaint be made to any justice, that there is good cause to
fear that a person intends to commit an offense against the person or
property of another, he shall examine the complainant on oath, and
any witnesses who may be produced, reduce the complaint to writ-
ing, and cause it to be signed by the complainant. If it appear proper,
such justice shall issue a warrant, reciting the complaint, and require
the person complained of forthwith to be apprehended and brought
before him or some other justice of the county.
W. VA. CODE, ch. 62, art. 10, § 2. (Michie 1966).
2
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is held before the justice.' Upon determination of defendant's guilt,
a recognizance to keep the peace, in the amount of $500, is set.
Upon the husband's failure to post the recognizance bond for lack
of funds, he is sent to jail.8
The object of the peace bond statutes is to prevent future acts
of violence. Anyone can make a complaint to a justice of the peace
that he has reason to believe someone will harm him, and the
justice will issue the warrant. At a hearing, if it appears to the
justice that the defendant has performed some act which justifies the
complainant's trepidation, the defendant is required to give a recogni-
zance, or, if unable, to go to jail for a term not to exceed one year.
In the stated hypothetical the defendant went to jail, not because of
the act committed, but because he had no money. The statute is
clear - if money is unavailable, jail is the only alternative. How-
ever, it is necessary to follow the procedure one step further to
appreciate the full effect of the inability to post the recognizance.
"A person from whom such recognizance is required may on
giving it, appeal to the circuit court of the county .... ." Thus, only if
the recognizance is tendered may the defendant appeal to a higher
court. The right of the defendant to appeal is dependent upon his
financial ability to post a recognizance bond.
7 "When such person appears, if the justice, on hearing the
parties, consider that there is not good cause for the complaint, he
shall discharge such person, and may give judgment in his favor and
against the complainant for his costs. If he considers there is good
cause therefor, he may require a recognizance of the person against
whom it is, and give judgment against him for the costs of the prose-
cution, or any part thereof; and, unless such recognizance be given,
he shall commit him to jail, by a warrant, stating the sum the time
for and in which the recognizance is directed. A person from whom
such recognizance is required may, on giving it, appeal to the cir-
cuit court of the county; and in such case the justice from whose
judgment the appeal is taken shall recognize such of the witnesses
as he may deem proper.
W. VA. CODE, ch. 62, art. 10, sec. 3 (Michie 1966).8 A person not giving and for whom no other person gives, a
recognizance to keep the peace shall be committed to jail. He shall
be discharged therefrom when such recognizance is given before the
court or justice, or when the period for which it was required has
elapsed, or when the discharge of such person is directed by the
court or justice having jurisdiction thereof.
W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 6, § 2 (Michie 1966).
Every recognizance to keep the peace shall be conditioned to the
effect that the person of whom it is taken shall keep the peace and
be of good behavior for such time, not exceeding one year . . ..
W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 6, § 1 (Michie 1966).
9 W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 10, §3 (Michie 1966) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 74
3
Rolston: Peace Bond--A Questionable Procedure for a Legitimate State Inter
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1972
STUDENT NOTES
It is the purpose of this note to determine whether this
system passes constitutional muster when viewed in light of equal
protection and due process concepts.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The dilemma of the indigent in the American judicial system
has received increased attention recently in both civil and criminal
cases. Frequently, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment has been invoked to assure the protection of the indigent's
rights. For instance, the Supreme Court in Harper v. Board of Educa-
tion'" declared the Virginia poll tax unconstitutional, concluding that
a state violates the equal protection clause whenever it makes the
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.
In the criminal context, Griffin v. Illinois," Douglas v. California,"2
William v. Illinois," and Tate v. Short" represent the landmark equal
protection cases. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment demands that people in like positions be treated the same
under the law: wealth should not determine the outcome of a case.
In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that because a transcript was
necessary to obtain an appeal, an indigent prisoner desiring to
appeal must be provided a free transcript. The requirement of a
transcript to appeal a conviction is analogous to the requirement of
posting a recognizance bond before an appeal can be granted. In
Griffin, as in the hypothetical situation, lack of money resulted in
loss of liberty and denial of equal protection. Thus, it seems to follow
that if Griffin violates the equal protection clause, the peace bond
proceeding also violates the equal protection clause.
The Court's holding in Williams similarly illustrates the uncon-
stitutionality of the peace bond statutes. Williams was given the
maximum sentence for petty theft under Illinois law - one year's
imprisonment and a $500 fine, plus court costs.'" After the expira-
tion of the year's imprisonment, William's inability to pay the fine
forced him to remain in jail to work off the fine. Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, used the equal protec-
tion rationale to declare the extended imprisonment invidious dis-
10 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
" 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
12 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
13 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
14401 U.S. 395 (1971).
Is 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 3 [1972], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol74/iss3/9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
crimination because it subjected some criminals to additional con-
finement solely because they were poor."6
In Morris v. Schoonfield,"' the Court made its first application
of the Williams doctrine. More importantly, four justices 8 joined
in a concurring opinion, stating:
[T]he same constitutional defect condemned in Williams
also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make
immediate payment of any fine, whether or not the fine
is accompanied by a jail term and whether or not the jail
term of the indigent extends beyond the maximum term
that may be imposed on a person willing and able to pay
a fine. In each case, the Constitution prohibits the state
from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically
converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.' 9
The Williams decision and the Schoonfield concurring opinion
provided the basis for the Tate holding that one could not be con-
fined because of inability to pay a fine. In Tate, the petitioner who
was unable to pay $425 in traffic fines was committed to the munici-
pal prison farm to work off his fines at the rate of $5 per day. The
Court, in finding such confinement resulting from indigency uncon-
stitutional discrimination, explicitly adopted the Schoonfield con-
curring opinion as its majority opinion.2"
16Chief Justice Burger said: "We conclude that when the aggregate
imprisonment exceeds the maximum period fixed by statute and results directly
from an involuntary nonpayment of a fine or court costs we are confronted
with an impermissible discrimination that rests on ability to pay, and accord-
ingly, we vacate the judgment below." Id. at 241.
17 399 U. S. 508 (1970). The case involved a Maryland statute providing
for commitment to jail for nonpayment of fines and costs. In the lower court,
a three-judge panel had held the statute itself valid, but ordered the release of
the defendants because they were denied the opportunity to reveal their
indigency. Morris v. Schoonfield, 301 F. Supp. 158 (1969). The Supreme
Court, noting the Maryland statute had changed, vacated and remanded the
judgment to the district court for reconsideration in light of the new legisla-
tion and Williams.
18 Justice White wrote the concurring opinion and Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan and Marshall joined.
19 399 U.S. at 509.
2oThe Court said:
In Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 . . . four members of the
Court anticipated the problem of this case and stated the view, which
we now adopt, that "the same constitutional defect condemned in
Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make im-
mediate payment of any fine....
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 396 (1971).
[Vol. 74
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Is there a distinction between a fine and a recognizance bond
that could operate to make the Tate and Williams decisions inap-
plicable to the peace bond proceedings? In the Tate situation, after
a crime had been committed, the wrongdoer was punished by
imposing a sentence in the form of a fine. If the wrong doer was
an indigent, the fine converted into a jail term. In the peace bond
situation, after a crime has allegedly been committed, the accused
is punished by requiring the posting of a bond. If the defendant is an
indigent, the bond converts into a jail term. While the sentence and
the bond are distinguishable, the former relating to prior criminal
acts and the latter to future criminal acts, the unconstitutional
factor remains constant, i.e., conversion into a jail term solely on
the basis of indigency.
I. DuE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Statutes can not arbitrarily infringe upon a constitutionally
protected interest.2' Due process requires that before an individual
can be deprived of his liberty certain requirements must be met.
Therefore, the West Virginia peace bond proceeding will be analyzed
according to substantive and procedural due process standards.
A. Substantive Due Process
Due process dictates that a penal statute be definite in its
wording, clearly outlining proscribed conduct. In Connally v. General
Construction Co.,22 the Supreme Court said:
[T]he terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must
be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to
it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties.... And a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
21 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 245 (1970) (concurring opinion).
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in Williams on the
basis that the statute violated the due process clause, rather than the equal
protection clause. He believed that the state legislatures had irnpermissibly
affected an individual's liberty. He examined the state's interest in having the
statute and determined that the state's interest did not outweigh the individ-
ual's right to be free. In Tate, Justice Harlan again concurred on the basis
of his Williams opinion.
22 269 U.S. 385 (1926). This case involved a suit to restrain state and
county officials of Oklahoma from enforcing a statute purporting to prescribe
a minimum wage for workmen employed by contractors in the execution of
contracts with the state. The statute imposed a fine or imprisonment for each
day's violation, and the United States Supreme Court held the statute void
for uncertainty.
6
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intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.2
The peace bond statutes provide that if there "is good cause
to fear that a person intends to commit an offense" 4 a complaint
may be sworn out and if the justice determines there is "good cause,"
a recognizance is required. 5 The statute contains three nebulous
terms: "good cause," "fear," and "offense."
First, the "good cause" standard used to justify the issuance of a
complaint and subsequently to require a recognizance is so vague
that it leaves the justice of the peace with wide discretion in the
application of the law. For example, under the good cause standard,
is a verbal threat against one's life enough, or is a physically violent
act required? Because the statute does not give the justice any clear
guidelines, he must speculate as to the meaning of the statute. But
more importantly, the individual must also speculate.
Second, is a complainant's testimony of 'fear" justification for
the issuance of a peace warrant? By what standard is fear to be
measured? Is the complainant's bare statement that he is afraid
sufficient, or must there be some evidence to justify fear in a rea-
sonable man?2" Once again, the justice is left with wide discretion
and inadequate guidelines.
Third, fear that a person intends to commit an "offense" offers
no indication of what acts are proscribed or what conduct is ex-
pected; it offers no guidelines for behavior. As a Florida district
court said in striking down a disorderly conduct statute, "Criminal
statutes that do not clearly define the outlawed conduct ... [compel]
enforcement officers,... to guess at what violates the law, thus either
setting the stage for arbitrary police action or, if police and prose-
cutors evolve their own rational standards of enforcement, con-
stituting an inappropriate delegation of criminal lawmaking
authority."27 The Supreme Court in Connally struck down a law that
2 3 id. at 391.24 W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 10 § 2 (Michie 1966).25 
W. VA. CoDE ch. 62, art. 10, § 3 (Michie 1966).
26 In State v. Cowger, 83 W. Va. 153, 98 S.E. 71 (1919), the West Vir-
ginia court held that a peace warrant must state facts or circumstances which
show the fear is well-founded or it should be quashed. It does not appear that
such a decision established a clear-cut standard.27Severson v. Duff, 322 F. Supp. 4, 6 (1970). The petitioner in this
habeas corpus case was convicted and adjudged guilty of disorderly conduct
(Vol. 74
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imposed a fine or imprisonment on those who did not comply
with a minimum wage statute. The Court recognized that "[t]he
dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful cannot be left to
conjecture. The citizen cannot be held to answer charges based upon
penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that they will reason-
ably admit of different constructions."28
As these varibles - good cause, fear, and the indefiniteness of
what constitutes an offense - give rise to too many uncertainties,
the peace bond statute does not meet the requirements of the United
States Constitution.
However, one more factor must be considered. In some in-
stances, the United States Supreme Court has found some statutes,
in themselves vague, to be definite enough if any of the following tests
are met: Could the person alleging vagueness have known of the
statute? Could he have perceived its ambiguity without much in-
convenience and have done something which would have made
clear in his particular case the statutes meaning? Could he have
complied with the statute under any interpretation?29
Because the "good cause" standard and "fear that a person
intends to commit an offense" are not capable of precise definition
by any interpretation, West Virginia's peace bond statute does not
fall within this "curing doctrine."
B. Procedural Due Process
The degree of procedural safeguards that must be afforded a
defendant vary with the nature of the proceeding. In civil actions, at
the very least a defendant has a right to notice and a fair hearing."0
In a criminal proceeding the defendant is afforded a greater degree
of procedural protection." Therefore, the protection afforded a
in violation of Florida statutes. The statutes proscribed acts which are of a
nature to corrupt public morals or outrage a sense of public decency or affect
the peace and quiet of persons who may witness them. The statutes were
declared unconstitutional because of vagueness and overbreadth.
28 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926).29 Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. Rnv. 67, n.99
(1960).
30 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The question before the
Court was whether a state that terminated public assistance payments to a
particular recipient without affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing prior to termination denied the recipient due process. The Court held
that a hearing was required before the benefits could be terminated. See
Comment, 73, W. VA. L. Rv. 80 (1971).
31 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to subpoena witnesses);
8
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defendant in a peace bond proceeding will vary depending on its
classification as civil or criminal. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals has never made such a determination, but it has recog-
nized the penal nature of such a proceeding.32 It is entirely possible
that the court today might not concern itself with the classification
of the peace bond proceedings as criminal or civil. Instead the court
might look to the ultimate effect of the proceedings upon the de-
fendant and rule that it is so grave in nature (potential confinement
in jail up to one year) that the defendant is entitled to the same
procedural safeguards that protect a defendant in any civil proceed-
ings plus some added safeguards found in a criminal proceeding
such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption of
innocence.
To convict the accused, due process requires that proof must
be established beyond a reasonable doubt.33 Under the West Virginia
practice in the peace bond proceedings, the degree of proof needed
to require a recognizance and subsequently send the defendant to
jail is no more than good cause initially required to issue the warrant.
The accused can in effect be adjudged guilty on no greater evidence
than that required to support his initial arrest. Such a practice is
clearly violative of due process.
Malloy v. Hogan, 387 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege from self-incrimination);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1963) (confrontation and cross-examination);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 235 (1963) (right to appointed counsel in
a felony trial); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (fair tribunal); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (fair trial); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S.
432 (1895) (presumption of innocence); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304
(1881) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Beatty, 51 W. Va. 232,
41 S.E. 434 (1902) (notice).
32 Judge Poffenbarger in State v. Gilliland, 51 W. Va. 278, 280-81, 41
S.E. 131-32 (1902), stated:
"It is said by Blk. Com., Book IV, 252 that this jurisdiction falls
under the title of preventive justice, and he there discriminates be-
tween preventive justice and punishing justice. But this certainly does
not mean a judgment requiring such recognizance is not punishment
. It would be difficult to class it (recognizance bond) as any-
thing other than punishment. When the bond is required and not
given, the consequence is imprisonment. It is required under pain
of punishment. How could it be anything else than punishment ... ?
33 Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881). In that case involving
a bigamy trial, the Court said, "The evidence upon which a jury is justified
in returning a verdict of guilty must be sufficient to produce a conviction of
guilt, to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt." Because the Hawaii peace
bond statute failed to require this degree of proof, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii struck down HAWAII Rnv. STAT. ch. 709, Part II, "Bond to keep the
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In conjunction with the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard due process presupposes innocence until a person is found
guilty, 4 but the West Virginia peace bond statutes shift the burden
of proof to the accused. The hearing to determine whether a bond
should be required of a defendant amounts to only a rehearing of
whether there is good cause to support the original complaint and
warrant for arrest. The accused appears before the justice confronted
by a showing of facts and circumstances already sufficient to require
recognizance. If the accused is to avoid adjudication against him, he
must show that complainant's good cause does not exist, which neces-
sarily shifts the burden of proof.
IV. CONCLUSION
The West Virginia peace bond statutes have a practical purpose.
They provide a speedy remedy to settle minor disputes. However,
this need cannot and must not be allowed to create an abuse of the
accused's constitutional rights. Presently this proceeding lacks the
fundamental requisites of equal protection and due process. Thus, the
statutes should be revised to meet these constitutional demands.
Charlotte Rolston
34 In Coffin v. US., 156 U.S. 432 (1895), the Court called the presump-
tion of innocence the bedrock principle of criminal law.
10
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